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SUMMARY
North Korea’s decision in December
2002 to restart nuclear installations at Yongb-
yon that were shut down under the U.S.-North
Korean Agreed Framework of 1994 and its
announced withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty create an acute foreign
policy problem for the United States.  Restart-
ing the Yongbyon facilities opens up a possi-
ble North Korean intent to stage a “nuclear
breakout” of its nuclear program and openly
produce nuclear weapons. North Korea claims
that it has nuclear weapons and that it has
completed reprocessing nuclear weapons-
grade plutonium that could produce five or six
atomic bombs.  North Korea’s actions follow
the reported disclosure in October 2002 that
North Korea is operating a secret nuclear
program based on uranium enrichment and the
decision by the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) in No-
vember 2002 to suspend shipments of heavy
oil to North Korea — a key U.S. obligation
under the Agreed Framework.
The main elements of Bush Administrat-
ion policy are (1) demanding that North Korea
totally dismantle its nuclear programs; (2)
withholding any U.S. reciprocal measures
until North Korea takes visible steps to dis-
mantle its nuclear programs; (3) assembling
an international coalition to apply pressure on
North Korea in multilateral talks; and (4)
planning for future economic sanctions and
military interdiction against North Korea.
China organized six-party talks among the
United States, China, Japan, North Korea,
South Korea, and Russia in mid-2003, but the
talks have made little progress.  U.S. attempts
to isolate North Korea in the talks have been
countered by North Korea’s strategy of threats
to leave the talks, the issuance of settlement
proposals, accusations that the United States
plans an “Iraq-like” attack on North Korea,
and denials that it has a uranium enrichment
program. North Korea’s announcement of
February 10, 2005, suspending its participa-
tion in the talks appears aimed at creating a
long-term diplomatic stalemate on the nuclear
issue.
Differences have emerged between the
Bush Administration and South Korea over
policies toward North Korea.  South Korea
emphasizes bilateral reconciliation with North
Korea.  The South Korean public has become
critical of Bush Administration policies and
the U.S. military presence.  Anti-U.S. demon-
strations erupted in 2002, and Roh Moo-hyun
was elected President after criticizing the
United States.  In 2003-2004, the Pentagon
announced plans to relocate U.S. troops in
South Korea away from the demilitarized zone
and Seoul.  The United States will withdraw





The six party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs appeared to have collapsed in
view of North Korea’s statements, demands, and actions since February 10, 2005.  Since
February 10, North Korea claimed that it is a “full-fledged nuclear weapons state;”
suspended participation in the six party talks; rejected bilateral talks with the United States;
issued a radical agenda for any future talks demanding a significant reduction of U.S. military
power “in and around the Korean peninsula” and that the United States agree to a “peace
system” to replace the 1953 Korean armistice; shut down its operating five electrical
megawatt nuclear reactor with the stated intention of removing fuel rods for the production
of nuclear weapons-grade plutonium; and issued new threats to transfer nuclear materials to
terrorist groups.  U.S. intelligence officials stated that there is new evidence that North Korea
may be preparing to test a nuclear weapon.  The Bush Administration’s response has
consisted of sharp rhetorical attacks on North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il by President Bush
and U.S. urgings of China to pressure North Korea to return to the six party talks.  However,
China rejected a Bush Administration proposal to cut off oil supplies to North Korea.  In
sequential statements of May 10 and 11, China rejected using sanctions to pressure North
Korea on the nuclear issue and said that President Bush “destroyed the atmosphere” for the
talks by issuing personal attacks on Kim Jong-il.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Interests in South Korea
U.S. interests in the Republic of Korea (R.O.K. — South Korea) involve security,
economic, and political concerns.  The United States suffered over 33,000 killed and over
101,000 wounded in the Korean War (1950-53).  The United States agreed to defend South
Korea from external aggression in the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.  The United States
maintains about 34,000 troops there to supplement the 650,000-strong South Korean armed
forces.  This force is intended to deter North Korea’s (the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea — D.P.R.K.) 1.2 million-man army.  Since 1991, attention has focused on North
Korea’s drive to develop nuclear weapons (see CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea’s
Nuclear Weapons Program) and long-range missiles.
U.S. economic assistance to South Korea, from 1945 to 2002, totaled over $6 billion;
most economic aid ended in the mid-1970s as South Korea’s reached higher levels of
economic development.  U.S. military aid, from 1945 to 2002, totaled over $8.8 billion.  The
United States is South Korea’s second-largest trading partner (replaced as number one by
China in 2002) and largest export market.  South Korea is the seventh-largest U.S. trading
partner.  
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Recent Issues
Relations with North Korea
The Bush Administration’s policy toward North Korea has been based on two factors
within the Administration.  First, President Bush has voiced  distrust of North Korea and its
leader, Kim Jong-il.  Second, there are divisions within the Administration over policy
toward North Korea.  An influential coalition consists of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and
his advisers, Vice President Cheney and his advisers, and proliferation experts in the State
Department and White House led by Under Secretary of State John Bolton.  They reportedly
oppose negotiations with North Korea, favor the issuance of demands for unilateral North
Korean concessions on military issues, and advocate an overall U.S. strategy of isolating
North Korea diplomatically and through economic sanctions.  Officials within this group
express hope and/or expectations of a collapse of the North Korean regime.  A second
approach, advanced mainly by officials in the State Department and White House with
experience on East Asian and Korean issues, favor negotiations before adopting more
coercive measures; they reportedly doubt the effectiveness of a strategy to bring about a
North Korean collapse.
  President Bush’s designation of North Korea as part of an “axis of evil” in his January
29, 2002 State of the Union address symbolized an apparent hardening of the
Administration’s policy.  The policy is aimed at reducing and/or eliminating basic elements
of North Korean military power, including  nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons-grade
materials, missiles, and conventional artillery and rocket launchers positioned on the
demilitarized zone within range of the South Korean capital, Seoul.  The Administration’s
emphasis on WMDs mounted after the Central Intelligence Agency gained documentary
evidence in Afghanistan that Al Qaeda seeks WMDs.  This reportedly influenced the Bush
Administration to broaden the definition of the war against terrorism to include states like
North Korea that potentially could supply WMDs to Al Qaeda.
Nuclear Weapons and the Six-Party Talks.1  From 1994 to 2003, U.S. policy was
based largely on the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework of October 1994.  The Agreed
Framework dealt with  nuclear facilities that North Korea was developing at a site called
Yongbyon.   Facilities included a five megawatt nuclear reactor and a plutonium reprocessing
plant.  Two larger reactors were under construction.  U.S. intelligence estimates concluded
that these plutonium-based facilities could give North Korea the capability to produce over
30 atomic weapons annually.  North Korea had concluded a safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1992, which required North Korea to report
all nuclear programs to the IAEA and gave the IAEA the right to conduct a range of
inspections of North Korea’s nuclear installations.  However, North Korea obstructed or
refused IAEA inspections in 1993-94, including refusal to allow an IAEA special inspection
of a underground facility, which the IAEA believed was a nuclear waste site. 
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The Agreed Framework provided for the suspension of operations and construction of
North Korea’s “graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities” and  the storage of  8,000
nuclear fuel rods that North Korea had removed from the five megawatt reactor in May 1994.
It  provided to North Korea 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually until two light-water nuclear
reactors (LWRs) are constructed in North Korea.  The United States was obligated to
facilitate the heavy oil shipments and organize the construction of the LWRs.  The IAEA
monitored the freeze of the designated facilities and activities.  The Agreed Framework
stated that before North Korea receives nuclear materials for the LWRs, it was obligated to
come into full compliance with its obligations as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty with regard to its past nuclear activities.  Clinton Administration officials testified that
this clause obligated North Korea to allow  IAEA inspection of the suspected waste site and
the stored fuel rods.  They also testified that any additional North Korean nuclear programs,
including any secret programs, are covered by the 1992 safeguards agreement and are subject
immediately to IAEA safeguards, including inspections.
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was created to
implement provisions of the Agreed Framework related to heavy oil shipments and
construction of the LWRs.  Lead members are the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the
European Union.  The Agreed Framework set a target date of 2003 for completion of the first
of the LWRs. In 2002, KEDO officials projected the completion of the first LWRs in 2008.
From October 1995 through November 2002,  North Korea received the annual shipments
of 500,000 tons of heavy oil. 
According to U.S. officials, North Korea admitted to having a secret uranium
enrichment program when Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited Pyongyang in
October 2002 (North Korea since has denied making an admission).  This confirmed U.S.
intelligence information of such a program that had built up since 1998.  The Bush
Administration reacted by calling for concerned governments to pressure North Korea to
abandon the secret uranium enrichment program.  In November 2002, it pushed a resolution
through KEDO to suspend heavy oil shipments to North Korea. (The Administration
subsequently secured a suspension of construction of the light-water reactors; the suspension
was renewed in November 2004)  North Korea then initiated a number of aggressive moves
to reactivate the plutonium-based nuclear program shut down in 1994 under the Agreed
Framework: re-starting the small, five-megawatt nuclear reactor, announcing that
construction would resume on two larger reactors,  announcing that it would re-start the
plutonium reprocessing plant, and removing the 8,000 nuclear fuel rods from storage
facilities.  North Korea also expelled IAEA officials who had been monitoring the freeze of
the plutonium facilities under the Agreed Framework.  In January 2003, North Korea
announced withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  It threatened to end its
moratorium on long-range missile testing in effect since September 1999.  North Korea
asserted  that it possessed nuclear weapons and that it had  completed reprocessing of the
8,000 fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium.  Moreover, North Korea threatened to export
nuclear materials.  
 Restarting the Yongbyon installations opens up a North Korean option to stage a
“breakout” of its nuclear program by openly producing nuclear weapons.  The most
dangerous North Korean move would be to produce nuclear weapons-grade plutonium from
the 8,000 fuel rods.  According to estimates by nuclear experts and reportedly by U.S.
intelligence agencies, reprocessing of the fuel rods would produce enough plutonium for four
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to six atomic bombs.  A Central Intelligence statement of August 18, 2003, estimated “that
North Korea has produced one or two simple fission-type nuclear weapons and has validated
the designs without conducting yield-producing nuclear tests.”  Reuters News Agency and
the Washington Post reported on April 28, 2004, that U.S. intelligence agencies were
preparing a new National Intelligence Estimate that likely would conclude that North Korea
had approximately eight atomic bombs based on plutonium and that the secret uranium
enrichment program would be operational by 2007 and would produce enough weapons-
grade uranium for up to six atomic bombs annually.
The  Administration’s policy has contained three elements: (1) a demand for unilateral
concessions, (2) the avoidance of direct negotiations with North Korea, and (3) the isolation
of North Korea internationally.  In demanding unilateral concessions, the Administration
called on North Korea to commit to and take concrete measures to realize the “complete,
verifiable, irreversible dismantlement” of its nuclear programs, both the plutonium program
and the secret uranium enrichment program.  This demand has become known as “CVID.”
The Administration asserts that North Korea must follow procedures similar to those that
Libya has adopted in giving up its weapons of mass destruction.
Administration officials have spoken often about the objective of “isolating” North
Korea.  There are two components to this goal.  One is to isolate North Korea from
diplomatic support from other governments over the nuclear issue and create a bloc of
governments demanding that North Korea accept CVID.  The second component is the
creation of a coalition of governments willing to impose economic  sanctions on North Korea
if Pyongyang rejects CVID.  Since May 2003, the United States has formed a Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) with more than ten other countries aimed at interdicting exports of
weapons of mass destruction and illegal drugs by proliferator countries.  Measures are being
planned to interdict North Korean sea and air traffic.  The Administration reportedly has
drafted plans for economic sanctions, including cutting off financial flows to North Korea
from Japan and other sources and interdicting North Korean shipments of missiles and other
weapons to the Middle East and South Asia.  The Administration is pressuring several
countries to cease purchases of North Korean missiles.  The aim of the PSI would be to
constrict sharply North Korean foreign exchange earnings, which are a major source of
sustenance to the North Korean political elite and the North Korean military.
In early 2003, the Administration proposed multilateral talks as the diplomatic focus.
After a U.S.-North Korea-China meeting in April 2003, three plenary sessions of six-party
talks (including South Korea, Japan, and Russia) were held in August 2003,  February 2004,
and June 2004.  The Administration has viewed several roles for the six-party talks.  The
talks help the Administration avoid bilateral negotiations with North Korea.  Until the June
2004 meeting, the Administration limited direct contact with North Korean delegates.  The
Administration also views the six-party talks as giving it a vehicle to secure support from
China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia for the U.S. CVID demand.  U.S. officials have
spoken of creating a five-versus-one situation in the six-party talks, thus isolating North
Korea.  This would lay the groundwork for the participation of these countries in sanctions
against North Korea if North Korea rejected CVID — sanctions either through the U.N.
Security Council and/or the PSI.  Throughout 2003, Administration officials expressed a
view that North Korea would isolate itself through its provocative actions in reopening its




The Administration has placed emphasis on China’s role in the talks, stating that China
should exert diplomatic pressure on North Korea to accept CVID.  Some Administration
officials have expressed the view that China can be persuaded to join the United States in
sanctions against North Korea even to the extent of creating an internal crisis within the
North Korean regime.  The importance of China is pointed up by the mutual defense treaty
China has with North Korea and China’s role in supplying North Korea with an estimated
90% of its oil and 40% of its food.
In the summer of 2003, the North Korean leadership appeared worried at the prospect
of international isolation and heavier U.S. pressure.  From that point, there emerged a
multifaceted North Korean diplomatic strategy backed by a concerted propaganda campaign
aimed at strengthening Pyongyang’s position in the six-party talks and weakening the U.S.
position.  A lead component of North Korea’s strategy has been to threaten repeatedly that
it would abandon the six-party talks.  North Korea apparently has employed this threat to
demand that China, the host of the talks, provide it with financial subsidies and increased
shipments of food and oil as “payment” for North Korean agreement to attend future sessions
of the talks.  But with these  threats, North Korea has made a series of proposals: first, a
formal U.S.-North Korean non-aggression pact, later modified to a formal U.S. guarantee
that the United States would not attack North Korea; second, a “freeze” of North Korea’s
plutonium program; and third, retention by North Korea of a “peaceful” nuclear program.
North Korean proposals have called for extensive concessions by the United States and
Japan, including removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorist-supporting states,
supply of electricity, several billion dollars in “compensation” from Japan, restoration of
shipments of heavy oil and construction of the two light-water nuclear reactors under the
1994 Agreed Framework, and an end to U.S. economic sanctions and U.S. interference in
North Korea’s economic relations with other countries.  While keeping its proposals vague
regarding content and its own obligations, North Korea has engaged in a concerted
propaganda campaign, promoting its proposals and accusing the Bush Administration of
plotting an “Iraq-like” attack.
An element in North Korea’s counter-strategy has been a campaign to deny that it has
a uranium enrichment (HEU) program.  From the summer of 2003, North Korean
propaganda organs have escalated  denials of an HEU program and denials that North Korean
officials admitted an HEU program to Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in October
2002.  North Korea also moderated its threats of proliferation and testing.  
North Korea clearly occupied a stronger position in the February and June 2004 plenary
sessions of the six-party talks and in the six-party working group meeting in May 2004.  The
Administration’s goal of creating a five-versus-one situation remained distant.  North
Korea’s proposals for a nuclear “freeze” and retention of a “peaceful” nuclear program
occupied much of these meetings.  U.S. negotiators claimed that the other four participants
supported CVID; but China and Russia expressed sympathy and/or support for Pyongyang’s
proposals of a U.S. non-aggression guarantee, nuclear freeze, and North Korean retention of
a “peaceful” nuclear program.  China has asserted that the goal of the talks should be to
eliminate North Korea’s “nuclear weapons” rather than its nuclear programs.  Russia and
China  voiced doubts that North Korea has an HEU program, and they did not challenge
North Korea’s denial strategy; in June 2004, a top Chinese official openly challenged the
U.S. claim.  Moreover, North Korea had succeeded in extracting more fuel, food, and
financial subsidies (at least $50 million) from China in bargaining over North Korea’s
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participation in the talks.  China, Russia, and South Korea expressed opposition to economic
sanctions, and only Japan joined the PSI.
The Bush Administration modified its policy in certain areas to counter North Korean
strategy and the attitudes of China and Russia but with minimum success.  President Bush
responded to Chinese urgings in October 2003 and offered to propose a multilateral security
guarantee to North Korea.  The Administration attempted to use the reported “confession”
of A.Q. Khan, Pakistan’s nuclear czar, to rebuff North Korea’s denial campaign regarding
the HEU program; Khan reportedly admitted that he had transferred technology and
components of an HEU program to North Korea.  However, Khan’s “confession” was based
on second-hand information; and it did not change the Russian and Chinese positions.
Pressure from the other participants in the six-party talks and the lack of progress
toward U.S. goals at the talks appear to be major factors behind the Bush Administration’s
decision to issue the comprehensive proposal of June 23, 2004.  The U.S. proposal called for
a quick dismantlement of North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichment programs
following a three-month “preparatory period.”  During the preparatory period, North Korea
would declare its nuclear facilities and materials, suspend their operation, allow effective
international inspections including a return of the IAEA, and negotiate the steps to be taken
in dismantlement.  In return, South Korea and Japan would supply North Korea with heavy
oil.  North Korea would receive a “provisional multilateral security assurance” against a U.S.
attack.  The United States and North Korea would begin talks over U.S. economic sanctions
and North Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. list of terrorist-supporting countries.  The
participants in the talks also would begin a study of North Korea’s energy situation.  After
North Korea completed dismantlement, it would receive a permanent security guarantee, and
permanent solutions to its energy problems would be undertaken.
  North Korea’s decision, announced on July 24, 2004, to reject the U.S. proposal as a
“sham proposal” and its subsequent refusal to participate in scheduled six-party meetings in
August and September 2004, apparently was motivated at least in part by the objective of
“killing” the June 23 proposal as an active basis of future negotiations.  Pyongyang seemed
to believe that if it succeeded, the United States would be in a weakened position with
limited options in 2005.  The other six-party participants gave no endorsements or positive
statements of the June 23 proposal after the June 2004 six-party meeting; this appears to have
encouraged North Korea to initiate its “kill strategy.”  The other governments refrained from
criticizing North Korea’s post-July 24 obstructionist tactics.  China and Russia continued to
voice support for elements of North Korea’s “reward for freeze” proposal; and they
continued to express skepticism toward the U.S. claim of a secret North Korean HEU
program.  South Korean officials joined in voicing skepticism.  China reportedly continued
to offer “gifts” of oil, food, and money.  The Bush Administration did not have a followup
strategy to promote the June 23 proposal, gain diplomatic support for it from the other six-
party governments, and create pressure on North Korea to accept it as a basis for
negotiations.  By the time of the U.S.2004 elections, Chinese, South Korean, and Russian
officials stated publicly that the U.S. proposal was inadequate.  China and South Korea
reportedly want the United States to contribute financially to the delivery of heavy oil to
North Korea in the first stage of a settlement.  South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s
speeches in November 2004 criticized U.S. policies and praised North Korea’s “reward for
freeze” proposal.
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North Korea formalized this strategy with its statements of February 10 and 19, 2005,
claiming that it has nuclear weapons, suspending participation in the six-party talks, and
rejecting bilateral negotiations with the United States.  North Korea appears to have felt
confident enough of its diplomatic position that it expanded its diplomatic objectives to the
creation of a protracted, long-term diplomatic stalemate on the nuclear issue.
North Korea’s Missile Program.2  North Korea’s proposal at Beijing offers to
“settle the missile issue” but provides no details.  North Korea has maintained a moratorium
on flight testing of long-range missiles since September 1999.  The last such missile test, on
August 31, 1998, flew over Japanese territory.  Japan also believes it is threatened by
approximately 100 intermediate-range Nodong missiles, which North Korea has deployed.
Japanese negotiators at Beijing emphasized the missile issue.  Reports since 2000 cite U.S.
intelligence findings that North Korea is developing a Taepo Dong-2  intercontinental missile
that would be capable of striking Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast with nuclear
weapons.  U.S. officials reportedly claimed in September 2003 that North Korea had
developed a more accurate, longer-range intermediate ballistic missile that could reach
Okinawa and Guam (sites of major U.S. military bases) and that there was evidence that
North Korea had produced the Taepo Dong-2.  U.S. officials reportedly told Japanese
counterparts in July 2003 that North Korea was close to developing nuclear warheads for its
missiles.  Reports in mid-1994 asserted that North Korea was close to completing
underground missile bases for advanced intermediate-range missiles that could reach both
Guam and Hawaii.
In the 1990s, North Korea exported short-range Scud missiles and Scud missile
technology to countries in the Middle East.  It exported Nodong missiles and Nodong
technology to Iran, Pakistan, and Libya.  In 1998, Iran and Pakistan successfully tested
medium-range missiles modeled on the Nodong.  Japan’s Sankei Shimbun newspaper
reported on August 6, 2003, that North Korea and Iran were negotiating a deal for the export
of the long-range Taepo Dong-2 missile to Iran and the joint development of nuclear
warheads.  Pakistani and Iranian tests of North Korean-designed missiles have provided
“surrogate testing” that benefits North Korea and dilutes the limitations of the September
1999 moratorium. 
The test launch of the Taepo Dong-1 spurred the Clinton Administration to intensify
diplomacy on North Korea’s missile program.  The Administration’s 1999 Perry initiative
set the goal of “verifiable cessation of testing, production and deployment of missiles
exceeding the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the complete
cessation of export sales of such missiles and the equipment and technology associated with
them.”  The Perry initiative offered  to normalize U.S.-North Korean relations, an end to U.S.
economic sanctions, and other economic benefits in return for positive North Korean actions
on the missile and nuclear issues.  This produced the September 1999 North Korean
moratorium on long-range missile testing.  The Clinton Administration responded in June




In October 2002, the Clinton Administration reportedly proposed a comprehensive deal
covering all aspects of the issue. North Korea offered to prohibit exports of medium- and
long-range missiles and related technologies in exchange for “in-kind assistance.” (North
Korea previously had demanded $1 billion annually.)  It also offered to ban permanently
missile tests and production above a certain range in exchange for “in-kind assistance” and
assistance in launching commercial satellites.  Pyongyang offered to cease the deployment
of Nodong and Taepo Dong missiles.  It proposed that President Clinton visit North Korea
to conclude an agreement.  The negotiations reportedly stalled over four issues: North
Korea’s refusal to include short-range Scud missiles in a missile settlement; North Korea’s
non-response to the U.S. position that it would have to agree to dismantle the already
deployed Nodong missiles; the details of U.S. verification of a missile agreement; and the
nature and size of a U.S. financial compensation  package. 
 The Bush Administration repeatedly described North Korea as a dangerous proliferator
of missiles and demanded that North Korea cease exporting missiles and missile technology.
However, the Administration has offered no specific negotiating proposal on missiles.  The
Administration emphasized the necessity of installing an anti-missile defense system in
Alaska, which it claimed would be 90% effective in intercepting North Korean missiles; non-
Administration experts have expressed skepticism over this claim.
Weapons of Mass Destruction.3  The Bush Administration’s emphasis on North
Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) resulted from the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attack.  A Pentagon report on the North Korean military, released in September
2000, stated that North Korea had developed up to 5,000 metric tons of chemical munitions
and had the capability to produce biological weapons, including anthrax, smallpox, the
bubonic plague, and cholera.  The Bush Administration has expressed concern that North
Korea might sell nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons to a terrorist group such as Al
Qaeda or that Al Qaeda might acquire these weapons from a Middle East country that had
purchased them from North Korea.  In November 2001, President Bush included North
Korea’s WMDs as part of the “war against terrorism.”  The Bush Administration has not
accused North Korea directly of providing terrorist groups with WMDs.  There are reports
from the early 1990s that North Korea exported nuclear technology to Iran and that North
Korea assisted Syria and Iran in developing chemical and biological weapons capabilities.
North Korea’s Inclusion on the U.S. Terrorism List.   In February 2000, North
Korea began to demand that the United States remove it from the U.S. list of terrorist
countries.  It made this a precondition for the visit of a high-level North Korean official to
Washington.  Although North Korea later dropped this precondition, it continued to demand
its removal from the terrorist list.  North Korea’s proposals at the six-party nuclear talks also
call for the United States to remove Pyongyang from the terrorist list.  North Korea’s chief
motive appears to be to open the way for the nation to receive financial aid from the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  P.L. 95-118, the International Financial
Institutions Act,  requires the United States to oppose any proposals in the IMF and World
Bank to extend loans or other financial assistance to countries on the terrorism list.  The
South Korean Kim Dae-jung Administration also urged the United States to remove North
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Korean from the terrorism list so that North Korea could receive international financial
assistance. 
Japan has urged the United States to keep North Korea on the terrorism list until North
Korea resolves  Japan’s concerns over North Korea’s sanctuary to members of the terrorist
Japanese Red Army organization and evidence that North Korea kidnapped and is holding
Japanese citizens.  The Clinton Administration gave Japan’s concerns increased priority in
U.S. diplomacy in 2000.  Secretary Albright raised the issue of kidnapped Japanese when she
met with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in October 2000. (See CRS Report RL30613, North
Korea: Terrorism List Removal?)  At the Beijing meetings, the Bush Administration called
on North Korea to resolve the issue with Japan.  In 2004, the Administration made the
kidnapping of Japanese citizens an official reason for North Korea’s inclusion on the terrorist
list.  Kim Jong-il’s admission, during the Kim-Koizumi summit of September 2002,  that
North Korea had kidnapped Japanese citizens did not resolve the issue.  His claim that eight
of the 13 admitted kidnapped victims are dead raised new issues for the Japanese
government, including information about the deaths of the kidnapped  and the possibility that
more Japanese were kidnapped.  The five living kidnapped Japanese returned to Japan in
October 2002.  In May 2004, North Korea released children of the five abductees (except two
daughters of an abductee) and an American military deserter living in North Korea.  In
return, Japan promised North Korea 250,000 tons of food and $10 million in medical
supplies.  However, in late 2004, Japan announced that the remains of two alleged kidnapped
Japanese that North Korea had turned over to Japan were false remains.  This prompted
demands in Japan for sanctions against North Korea.  The Bush Administration reportedly
advised Japan to refrain from sanctions because of a potential negative impact on the six-
party talks.
Food Aid.    From 1995 through 2004, the United States supplied North Korea with
over 1.9 million metric tons of food aid through the United Nations World Food Program
(WFP).  South Korea has extended increasing amounts of bilateral food aid to North Korea,
including one million tons of rice in 2004.  Agriculture production in North Korea began to
decline in the mid-1980s.  Severe food shortages appeared in 1990-1991.  In September
1995, North Korea appealed for international food assistance.  The Clinton Administration
used food aid to secure North Korean agreement to certain types of negotiations and North
Korean agreement to allow a U.S. inspection of the suspected nuclear site at Kumchangri.
The WFP acknowledges that North Korea  places restrictions on its monitors’ access to the
food distribution system, but it believes that most of its food aid reaches needy people.
Several private aid groups, however, withdrew from North Korea because of such restrictions
and suspicions that the North Korean regime was diverting food aid to the military or the
communist elite living mainly in the capital of Pyongyang.  It is generally agreed that the
regime gives priority to these two groups in its overall food distribution policy.  Some
experts also believe that North Korean officials divert some food aid for sale on the extensive
black market.  The regime has spent none of several billion dollars in foreign exchange
earnings since 1998 to import food or medicines.  The regime refuses to adopt agricultural
reforms similar to those of fellow communist countries, China and Vietnam, including
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dismantling of Stalinist collective farms.  It is estimated that one to three million North
Koreans died of malnutrition between 1995 and 2003.4
North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights.  This issue confronted
governments after March 2002 when North Korean refugees, aided by South Korean and
European NGOs, sought asylum in foreign diplomatic missions in China and the Chinese
government sought to prevent access to the missions and forcibly removed refugees from the
Japanese and South Korean embassies.  The refugee exodus from North Korea into China’s
Manchuria region began in the mid-1990s as the result of the dire food situation in North
Korea’s provinces in the far north and northeast along the Chinese border.  Estimates of the
number of refugees cover a huge range, from 10,000 to 300,000.
China followed conflicting policies reflecting conflicting interests.  Generally, China
tacitly accepted the refugees so long as their presence was underground and not highly
visible.  China also allowed foreign private NGOs, including South Korean NGOs, to
provide aid to the refugees, again so long as their activities were not highly visible.  China
barred any official international aid presence, including any role for the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees.  It also interrupted its general policy of tacit acceptance with
periodic crackdowns that included police sweeps of refugee populated areas, rounding up of
refugees, and repatriation to North Korea.  Since early 2002, China allowed refugees who
had gained asylum in foreign diplomatic missions to emigrate to South Korea.  However,
China’s crackdown on the border reportedly included the torture of captured refugees to gain
information on the NGOs that assisted them.  
 China tries to prevent any scenario that would lead to a collapse of the Pyongyang
regime, its long-standing ally.  Chinese officials fear that too much visibility of the refugees
and especially any U.N. presence could spark an escalation of the refugee outflow and lead
to a North Korean regime crisis and possible collapse.  China’s crackdowns are sometimes
a reaction to increased visibility of the refugee issue.  China’s interests in buttressing North
Korea also have made China susceptible to North Korean pressure to crack down on the
refugees and return them.  Reports in 2003 and 2004 described stepped-up security on both
sides of the China-North Korea border, including the deployment of Chinese army troops,
to stop the movement of refugees and Chinese roundups of refugees and repatriation of them
to North Korea.   South Korea, which previously had turned refugees away from its
diplomatic missions, changed its policy in response to the new situation.  It accepted refugees
seeking entrance into its missions and allowed them entrance into South Korea, and it
negotiated with China over how to deal with these refugees.5
The Bush Administration gave the refugee issue low priority.  The Administration
requested that China allow U.N. assistance to the refugees but asserted that South Korea
should have the lead diplomatically  with China.  The issue has been aired in congressional
hearings.  In June 2002, the House of Representatives passed H.Con.Res. 213, which calls
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on China to halt forced returns of refugees to North Korea and give the U.N. High
Commission on Refugees access to North  Korean refugees. 
The refugee issue had led to increased outside attention to human rights conditions in
North Korea.  Reports assert that refugees forcibly returned from China have been
imprisoned and tortured in an extensive apparatus of North Korean concentration camps
modeled after the “gulag” labor camp system in the Soviet Union under Stalin.  Reports by
Amnesty International, the U.S. State Department, and, most recently, the U.S. Committee
for Human Rights in North Korea have described this system as holding up to 250,000
people.  In 2003 and 2004, the United States secured resolutions from the U.N. Human
Rights Commission expressing concern over human rights violations in North Korea,
including concentration camps and forced labor.  South Korea abstained from the
Commission’s votes in the interest of pursuing its “sunshine” policy with North Korea.6   
South Korean officials also criticized passage by Congress in October 2004 of H.R.
4011, the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004. The act (P.L. 108-333) grants asylum
and legal immigration status to North Korean refugees and requires the U.S. executive
branch adopt a number of measures aimed at furthering human rights in North Korea,
including financial support of nongovernmental human rights groups, increased radio
broadcasts into North Korea,  sending of radios into North Korea, and a demand for more
effective monitoring of food aid.
South Korea’s Sunshine Policy and the Hyundai Payments to North Korea.
South Korean President Kim Dae-jung took office in 1998, proclaiming a “sunshine policy”
of reconciliation with North Korea.  He achieved an apparent breakthrough in meeting with
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, June 13-14, 2000.  Following the summit,
Seoul and Pyongyang negotiated agreements on the restoration of a railway and road across
the demilitarized zone (DMZ), investment guarantees and tax measures to stimulate South
Korean private investments in North Korea, provision of South Korean food aid to North
Korea, and flood control projects for the Imjim River.  President Kim called on the United
States to support his sunshine policy by normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea,
negotiating a missile agreement with Pyongyang, and removing North Korea from the U.S.
terrorist list.  Negotiations in August 2002 produced a renewal of family reunions and
agreement to implement economic agreements of 2000.  The roads in the eastern and western
sectors of the DMZ opened in 2003, and work on the rail lines is continuing.  Seoul and
Pyongyang reached agreement in November 2002 on South Korean aid to construct a special
economic zone at Kaesong inside North Korea to attract South Korean and other outside
private investment.  North Korea subsequently issued a law for foreign investment at
Kaesong.  The first South Korean companies began operations at Kaesong in late 2004.  In
June 2004, North and South Korea agreed to set up military hotlines and cease propaganda
broadcasts across the DMZ.  Current South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun has pledged to
continue aid, trade, and programs with North Korea under a “peace and prosperity” policy,
despite North Korea’s February 10, 2005 statement suspending its participation in the six-
party nuclear talks.
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The most controversial component of the sunshine policy has been the cash payments
the Hyundai Group has made to North Korea, supported by the R.O.K. government.  In
October 1998, Hyundai Asan, one of the member companies of the Hyundai Group, entered
into an agreement with North Korea to operate a tourism enterprise at Mount Kumgang in
North Korea.  The agreement stipulated that Hyundai Asan would make cash payments to
the North Korean government of $942 million over six years plus $300 from each tourist.
From 1999 into 2003, Hyundai made public cash payments of about $600 million to North
Korea for the Mt. Kumgang project and two other projects.7  According to informed sources
available to CRS in 2001, Hyundai companies made additional secret payments to North
Korea.  Hyundai officials and the Kim Dae-jung administration denied for nearly two years
that secret payments were made.  In early 2003, however, they admitted to secret payments
of $500 million and that the money was transferred shortly before the June 2000 North-South
summit.  
Investigations by a special prosecutor and South Korean newspapers revealed that North
Korean leader Kim Jong-il demanded $1 billion from Hyundai Asan in return for meeting
with Kim Dae-jung.8  Chung Mong-hun, the CEO of Hyundai Asan and one of the sons of
Hyundai’s founder, Chung Ju-yung, initially turned down the North Korean demand; but
officials of the Kim Dae-jung administration urged him to make payments.  Hyundai Asan
and North Korean officials agreed on $500 million on April 8, 2000. The special prosecutor’s
findings were that several Hyundai member companies of the Hyundai Group (also run by
Chung family members) were involved in making the secret payments a few days before the
summit: Hyundai Merchant Marine ($200 million); Hyundai Engineering and Construction
($150 million); Hyundai Electronics ($100 million); and Hyundai Asan ($50 million in
luxury goods).  The special prosecutor also found that officials of the government’s Korean
Exchange Bank and the National Intelligence Service helped the Hyundai companies transfer
the money to North Korean bank accounts in Macao, Singapore, and Austria.  Senior
officials of the Kim Dae-jung administration facilitated a loan of 400 billion won (about
$359 million) from the Korea Development Bank to Hyundai Merchant Marine.  The
company immediately transferred 223.5 billion won (about $190 million) of this to the
R.O.K. National Intelligence Service, which transferred the money to the North Korean bank
account in Macao.9  Thus, a sizeable share of the secret payments came from the South
Korean government.  President Roh Moo-hyun cut off the special prosecutor’s investigation
in June 2003; the opposition Grand National Party has charged that there were additional
secret payments totaling several hundred million dollars.  There were six indictments and
convictions of R.O.K. and Hyundai officials.
After the conclusion of the Mt. Kumgang agreement, U.S. military officials were
suspicious that North Korea was using the Hyundai money for military purposes.  U.S.
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military officials in Korea reportedly raised the issue with Hyundai officials in November
1999.  The Korea Herald, on February 5, 2001, quoted a spokesman for the U.S. Military
Command in Korea that “I know that military experts at home and abroad are concerned
about Pyongyang’s possible diversion of the [Hyundai] cash for military purposes.”  Most
serious is strong circumstantial evidence that the Hyundai payments helped North Korea to
accelerate the financing of  its secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear  program.  The
first element of this evidence is the corresponding time frame of 1999-2001 when the
Hyundai cash was flowing to North Korea and North Korea apparently was accelerating its
foreign exchange expenditures overseas to procure components and materials for the HEU
program.  According to CIA estimates and statements of former Clinton Administration
officials, quoted in the Washington Post of February 1, 2003,10 North Korea began to procure
uranium enrichment technology in 1999 and accelerated procurements and attempted
procurements into 2000 and 2001.  The Asian Wall Street Journal of October 29, 2002,
reported that North Korea had paid $75 million to Pakistan’s Khan laboratory, which
specialized in Pakistan’s HEU nuclear weapons program.11  Jim Hoagland reported in the
Washington Post of November 10, 2002, that North Korea had acquired 2,000-3,000
centrifuges, the basic infrastructure component for producing HEU; he also cited former
Clinton Administration officials that North Korea began to accelerate the program in 1999.12
A second element of evidence is that estimates of North Korea’s exports in 1999 and
2000 indicate that Hyundai cash payments of over $1 billion made up approximately 25%
of North Korea’s foreign exchange earnings.  North Korea’s economic collapse of the 1990s
reached a nadir in those years with commercial exports falling to around $600 million
annually.  North Korea also suffered from a commercial trade deficit of about $1 billion
annually.  Exports of missiles and illegal drugs were estimated at close to $1 billion in 2001
by the U.S. military command in South Korea, but other estimates of earnings from illegal
drugs is in the range of $200 million.13
The third element of evidence is the role of Bureau 39 of the North Korean Communist
Party as both the recipient of the Hyundai money and the procurer of overseas components
and technology for North Korea’s nuclear programs.  Bureau 39 reportedly is located in Kim
Jong-il’s headquarters and is directed by him.  Bureau 39’s functions reportedly include
controlling and enlarging the inflow of foreign exchange to Kim Jong-il through legal
exports and illegal exports such as drug smuggling.  It also directs North Korea’s foreign
exchange expenditures with two priorities: (1) procurement of luxury products from abroad
that Kim Jong-il distributes to a broad swath of North Korean military, party, and
government officials to secure their loyalty — estimated at $100 million annually by U.S.
military officials in Seoul, according to a Reuters report of March 4, 2003; and (2)
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procurement overseas of components and materials for North Korea’s weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs), including nuclear programs.  Bureau 39 is known to operate banks in
Macau, Singapore, and Vienna and a number of front companies overseas to purchase WMD
components.14  Marcos Noland of the Institute of International Economics wrote in 2000 that
Hyundai official payments for the Mount Kumgang tourist project apparently were “going
into the Macau bank account of Bureau 39.”15  The South Korean special prosecutor and
South Korean newspapers learned that the secret Hyundai payments of 2000 were transferred
to bank accounts in Macao, Singapore, and Vienna controlled by Bureau 39.  South Korea’s
National Intelligence Service reportedly intercepted a message of June 12, 2000, from the
head of North Korea’s Jokwang Trading Company in Macau (a known front of Bureau 39)
to Communist Party officials in  Pyongyang that the Hyundai secret payments had been
received.16
Anti-Americanism and Plans to Change the U.S. Military Presence17
Beginning in early 2003, the Bush Administration made a series of decisions that will
alter the U.S. presence in South Korea.  The Second Infantry Division of about 15,000 troops
would be withdrawn from its position just below the DMZ and relocated to “hub bases”
about 75 miles south; the U.S. Yongsan base, housing about 8,000 U.S. military personnel
in the center of Seoul, would be relocated away from the city. (A 1991 agreement to relocate
Yongsan never was implemented.)  In May-June 2004, the Pentagon disclosed a plan to
withdraw 12,500 U.S. troops from South Korea by the end of 2005, including the deployment
to Iraq by August 2004 of one of the two combat brigades of the Second Division.  Such a
withdrawal would reduce U.S. troop strength in South Korea from 37,000 to about 24,000.
The 3,600-man brigade left for Iraq in August 2004; but under South Korean pressure, the
Pentagon agreed in October 2004 to withdraw the remainder of the 12,500 troops in phases
stretching to September 2008 and to keep close to 1,000 U.S. military personnel in Seoul
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after the closing of the Yongsan base.  Pentagon officials spoke of U.S. military
compensation measures, including the augmentation of air and naval forces in the Western
Pacific; they later announced long-term training deployment of two squadrons of stealth
fighters and F-15 fighters to South Korea.  The Pentagon and the U.S. Pacific Command
reportedly are considering changes in the U.S. military command structure in Korea, which
presently includes the United Nations Command, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Command,
and the U.S.-South Korean Combined Forces Command.  The Pentagon will invest $11
billion to upgrade U.S. forces in Korea.  The South Korean government has expressed
reservations over the U.S. decisions; but it has concluded agreements with the Pentagon to
facilitate the relocations.  South Korea has agreed to assume the estimated $3-4 billion cost
of relocating the Yongsan garrison by 2008 in an agreement finalized in July 2004.
There are several rationales for the Pentagon’s decisions.  Relocation of the Second
Division will facilitate its restructuring and reorganization along the lines of the Pentagon’s
plans to restructure the U.S. Army’s traditional combat divisions into smaller, mobile combat
brigades.  The withdrawal of troops will help the U.S. Army meet the manpower burdens of
its role in Iraq and potentially in other fronts in the “war against terrorism.”  U.S. officials
also have voiced the hope that the troop changes and reduction would mitigate the rising anti-
American sentiment among South Koreans.
After 1998, South Korean public opinion became openly critical of the U.S. military
presence.  Later, criticisms arose of the Bush Administration’s policies toward North Korea,
reflecting South Korean public support for Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy.  South Koreans
increasingly viewed the U.S. military presence and the Bush Administration’s policy as
endangering South Korea’s efforts to improve relations with North Korea.  South Korean
fears of a military threat from North Korea have declined, according to polls.  Incidents
involving U.S. military personnel and South Korean civilians drew growing South Korean
criticisms.  In 2002, massive South Korean protests erupted when a U.S. military vehicle
killed two Korean schoolgirls and the U.S. military personnel driving the vehicle were
acquitted in a U.S. court martial.  Roh Moo-hyun was elected in December 2002 after
criticizing the United States during his campaign.  Anti-U.S. sentiment is strong among
younger South Koreans under 40, according to polls.  A January 2004 poll found that 39%
of respondents viewed the United States as the biggest threat to South Korea as compared
to 33% who viewed North Korea as the principal threat.  Fifty-eight percent of respondents
in their 20s viewed the United States as the larger threat by 58% (20% saw North Korea as
the larger threat).
A network of nongovernmental civic groups has taken up anti-American themes,
including some accusations similar to those advanced by North Korean propaganda.  A
widespread South Korean view, reportedly held by some officials of the Roh Moo-hyun
administration, is that the Pentagon’s plan to relocate the Second Division is intended to get
the Division out of range of North Korean artillery north of the DMZ so that the Bush
Administration could launch a unilateral attack against North Korea.  The U.S. invasion of
Iraq also drew criticism from the South Korean public.  President Roh faced  public criticism
for his decision to send 700 South Korean medical and engineering personnel to Iraq.  In
December 2003, South Korea announced that it would send a brigade-sized (about 3,000
troops) South Korean combat unit to Iraq.  President Roh reaffirmed that decision in June
2004 in the face of the execution of a South Korean national by Iraqi insurgents.  Roh has
asserted that his ability to influence U.S. policy toward North Korea is a primary reason for
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his support of the U.S. war against Iraq.  In October 2003, the R.O.K. government announced
that it would commit $200 million in reconstruction aid to Iraq.  
 The total cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea is nearly $3 billion annually.
The South Korean direct financial contribution for 2004 is $623 million, up from $399
million in 2000.
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